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FOREWORD 
This paper is one of several studies done at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences’ Insti-
tute for World Economics ((IWE) under the CIS Strategic Research Project. A contract 
between the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
in the summer of 2007, allowed some new, wide-ranging thematic research into the 
post-Soviet space to be launched. The project entitled “Hungary’s CIS strategy with 
special regard to Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan” gave new impetus to post-Soviet 
research in the IWE and its partner the Hungarian Academy of Sciences’ Research In-
stitute of Sociology. The new opportunity was important especially because the CIS or 
post-Soviet space had become a neglected area in Hungary over the previous 15 years 
and there was a research gap to fill. 
Meanwhile the post-Soviet space has been returning to the political agenda in the 
last year or two, due to rising ambitions in a strengthened Russia, sharp conflicts 
within the post-Soviet space, and worldwide problems of energy supply and prices. The 
research seeks to provide up-to-date answers to such emerging questions. 
The project sets out to cover a wide range of essential issues about the CIS space, 
notably the three most important countries for Hungary: Russia, Ukraine and Kazakh-
stan. It deals with the issues such as the regional energy prospects, the integration and 
disintegration processes among the CIS states, the formulation of relations with the 
European Union and with other important actors worldwide, and the effects of the 
world economy in the region. In conjunction with the key economic questions, it exam-
ines the current social and political changes and the various political systems. 
The intention is to create not just a network of Hungarian specialists on the post-
Soviet space, but an international network of researchers from these newly independent 
states. Inviting outside researchers and think-tanks to join us in this project was a first 
step. The IWE is currently working with Russian and Ukrainian partners. 
This paper written by Svetlana Glinkina, deputy director of the Institute of Econom-
ics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, analyses the important and challenging issue 
of how Russian integration ideas and initiatives within the CIS space fit into or clash 
with EU ideas. It is highly topical. Post-Soviet ideas of integration are usually seen as 
contrasting with EU ideas on integrating several CIS states, such as Ukraine or 
Moldova, into EU structures. Is this the only option? Naturally, the latest political 
events, such as the Georgian-Russian war of August 2008, tend to support this “ei-
ther/or” analysis. But from a longer perspective, Russian/EU cooperation on “common 
neighbourhood issues” seems inevitable. 
The first part gives an overview of the main Russian-initiated integration groups 
within the CIS space over the past 15 years, listing also some reasons why they failed 
to be realized. The second is devoted to one of the most challenging economic initia-
tives: the Common Economic Space, which aims to integrate Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, the region’s four largest economies. The third examines changing Rus-
sian approaches to cooperating with other CIS countries. The final part tries to put the 
European “common neighbourhood” into a special perspective, a so-called “Rus-
sia/Euroeast” dimension. 
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project leader 
5 
Processes of integration in the post-
Soviet area are constituents of an inter-
national process of world economic col-
laboration and regionalization, and sub-
ject to regularities that govern it. But 
they display a number of specific fea-
tures: 1. They involved former Soviet 
republics once parts of a single state. 
However, CIS states belong to a number 
of regional formations with bordering 
non-CIS states. 2. The formations are at 
the initial stage of economic integration. 
3. The process of creating and running 
the formations includes an express po-
litical component. 4. Development of the 
formations is interdependent and dupli-
cation apparent in certain functions. 
1) PRESENT LEVELS OF INTE-
GRATION AND COOPERATION 
There are serious problems with imple-
menting projects for regional post-Soviet 
integration with Russian participation. 
Table 1 shows the history of integra-
tion in the post-Soviet space to be a 
succession of unimplemented projects. 
Many reached no further than a state-
ment of aims and signing of foundation 
documents before dying. Professor Y. V. 
Shishkov, an authority on international 
economic integration has dubbed these 
“quasi-integration formations” or “Po-
temkin villages”. Regional unions of 
Russia and CIS countries have yet to 
advance beyond preparing for the initial 
stage of market integration and free 
trade zones. 
The first step towards creating a 
multilateral CIS free trade zone was the 
Agreement on Free Trade-Zone Forma-
tion in the Framework of the Treaty of 
the Economic Union of the CIS Coun-
tries signed in 1993 by nine countries: 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Taji-
kistan and Uzbekistan. Ukraine signed 
as an associated member, and Georgia 
and Turkmenistan excluded themselves. 
But the treaty was never implemented 
and expired as a de jure agreement in 
2003. 
A 1999 attempt to revive the 1993 
agreement failed for objective reasons 
after the default of the Russian rouble 
in August 1998 and consequent depre-
ciation of all national currencies, cou-
pled with corruption of the new pay-
ment system among “soft” CIS curren-
cies. The crisis in Russia spread to all 
CIS states, affecting regional trade and 
initiating a new protectionist phase. The 
member-states that had proposed the 
multilateral free trade zone (including 
Ukraine and Georgia at the time) 
sought easy access to Russian markets 
for their goods and cheap imports of 
fuel, and abolition of VAT on exports 
of oil, gas and gas condensate. But 
Russia was too much weakened by the 
default to start subsidizing CIS trade.  
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Table 1 
Regional integration in the post-Soviet space with Russian participation: 
declared aims and attained collaboration levels, 2008 
 
 
Name of 
formation 
Participant    
countries 
Year of   
creation Declared aims Attained level of collaboration 
Economic 
Union of 
CIS Coun-
tries. Treaty 
of 1993 
All CIS countries 
with Russia as 
leader (Ukraine as 
an associated 
member) 
1993 Free trade zone ? 
tax union ? com-
mon market ? 
monetary union and 
confederation of 
states 
Treaty of Economic Union ex-
pired in September 2003. The 
multilateral trade zone has not 
been created de jure, it functions 
de facto under bilateral agree-
ments 
Tax Union 
(ТU), 
1995–6 
Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan 
January 1995–
March 1996 
Tax union with 
prospects of creating
a common market 
synonymous with a 
common economic 
space 
Terminated in 2000 without hav-
ing attained unification of exter-
nal tariffs. Kyrgyzstan joined the 
WTO earlier than other TU 
countries and made unwarrant-
able commitments 
Eurasian 
Economic 
Community 
(EurAsEC) 
Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan—2006. 
Ukraine, Moldova, 
Armenia observers 
November 
2000 
Tax union ? com-
mon economic space 
and common Eura-
sian currency (by 
2008)* 
60 per cent of the tariffs of 
participating states have been 
reconciled; interstate trade lim-
ited, anti-dumping investigations 
occurring. The tax union is at a
development stage; the free trade 
zone functions within limits 
United State 
of Russia 
and Belarus 
Russia, Belarus April 2008: R–
B Community; 
Union of R 
and B 1997; 
United State, 
December 8, 
1999 treaty 
Confederation of two 
states with equal 
rights and common 
economic space, 
budget and currency 
(supposed to appear 
2005) 
Does not meet criteria of a 
common tax space; free trade 
zone functions with limitations. 
Major disagreements over com-
mon currency introduction and 
price preferences in trade 
United Eco-
nomic 
Space (UES) 
Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine 
Agreement and 
Concept of 
Formation, Sep-
tember 19, 
Yalta 
Free trade zone ? 
tax union ? UES ?
monetary union 
(2005–7) ? Organi-
zation of Regional 
Integration, coordin-
ated WTO policy 
Discords at agreement prepara-
tion stage. Ukraine ready only to 
create a free trade zone and 
joined the WTO after separate 
negotiations 
 
* Kazakhstani proposal supported by Russia: President N. Nazarbayev advanced the idea of a common 
currency or Altin at the Dushanbe summit in April 2003. 
Source: L. Kosikova: “Integration that Failed or Why Russia Cannot Unite the CIS Countries”. Mir 
Peremen, М., 2004:1, 108–23 and additions in 2005–8. 
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Later the CIS countries started to 
conclude free trade-zone agreements, 
which Russia now has with all other 
CIS countries. However, they incorporate 
various exemptions and limitations, typi-
cally for sugar, tobacco, cigarettes and 
spirits. Furthermore, the parties apply to 
each other non-tariff restrictions (quo-
tas, licences) and antidumping and pro-
tective duties as temporary trade meas-
ures for certain classes of goods.1 
Bilateral free-trade bilateral agree-
ments have produced free trade-zone 
conditions de facto without a multilat-
eral agreement being signed. According 
to the CIS Executive, almost 12,000 
commodity items are traded freely in 
the regional market, with only 27 hav-
ing official exceptions (stated in 10 bi-
lateral protocols). Anoher 200 items are 
limited by quotas.2 
The legal framework for a free trade 
zone within the EurAsEC has been de-
veloped to some extent. Free trade bi-
lateral agreements became a basis for 
trade between EurAsEC member-states 
that was not subject to tariff and quan-
titative limitations. Enabling agreements 
have already come into effect in five 
countries. New agreements and further 
implementation measures were needed 
when Uzbekistan joined EurAsEC in 
2006. 
There are almost no exceptions to 
the free trade between EurAsEC coun-
tries. This is also favoured by consulta-
tions on free trade compliance within 
the Commission on Customs Tariff and 
                                                   
1 See Section 4, “Direct and indirect preferences 
and subsidies analysis in trade with CIS coun-
tries”. 
2 Porously, V.: The condition of the economy 
and potential for cooperation among CIS mem-
ber-states. Obshchestvo i Ekonomika 2004:5–6, 
145. 
Non-Tariff regulations, acting within the 
EurAsEC Integration Committee. 
Currently, both domestic customs tar-
iff conditions and quotas and tax barri-
ers affecting trade are due to be re-
moved. It is also necessary to harmo-
nize indirect tax-collection systems in 
foreign trade, i.e. VAT and excise pay-
ments in these countries. Since 2001, all 
member-countries have applied the des-
tination country principle: 0 per cent 
VAT on commodity exports and refund-
ing of VAT to exporters by the budget. 
Currently, harmonization of excise pol-
icy is underway.  
The order under which each mem-
ber-state has a right to establish trade 
conditions for third (non-EurAsEC) 
countries on a national level at its own 
discretion has a negative effect on the 
development of a EurAsEC free trade 
regime free of exceptions and limita-
tions. Countries’ rights to conclude pro-
tocols on exceptions to the free trade-
zone conditions mean that all EurAsEC 
countries have independently signed bi-
lateral documents (on exceptions) with 
CIS countries that are not EurAsEC 
members. Furthermore, these protocols 
use different commodity classification to 
define the exceptions. 
This situation called for further har-
monization and held back development 
of the EurAsEC free trade-zone forma-
tion free of exceptions and limitations. 
The lack of conformity in the excep-
tions for third countries is currently 
being removed and levelled. The 
EurAsEC Intergovernmental Council con-
firmed a uniform commodities list for 
such exceptions, covering only a very 
limited number of items, and the 2004 
uniform schedule of exceptions pre-
scribed the removal of indicated com-
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modities from the list in the period 
2006–12. 
The provisions of the March 30, 
2002 Agreement on Customs and Tax 
Control of the Production and Turnover 
of Ethyl Spirit, Alcohol, Alcohol-
Containing and Tobacco Products on the 
Territory of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (March 30th 2002) were 
extended in March 2005 to sugar. 
Adoption of the corresponding docu-
ment3 finalizes the protection mechanism 
for EurAsEC countries within an envi-
ronment of non-usage of indicated ex-
ceptions by single EurAsEC member-
countries. 
All EurAsEC countries are due to 
sign a protocol on Completion of Full 
Free Trade Conditions and its execution 
by EurAsEC member-states, as the final 
step to forming a free trade zone for-
mation and embarking on a customs 
union. 
2) THE COMMON       
ECONOMIC SPACE 
The idea of integrating Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan into a common 
economic space (CES–4) evolved as a 
political initiative at summit level. Presi-
dents Vladimir Putin, Leonid Kuchma, 
Alexandr Lukashenko and Nursultan 
                                                   
3 Protocol Introducing Amendments and Sup-
plements to the Agreement on Customs and Tax 
Control over Production and Trading of Ethyl 
Alcohol, Alcohol, Alcohol-Containing and To-
bacco Products (white sugar added under 
EurAsEC Harmonized Commodity Description 
code 1701 99 100). 
Nazarbayev signed a brief single-page 
joint declaration on February 23, 2003 
in Moscow. Sometimes referred to as 
the Presidents’ Declaration, this ex-
presses a “political resolve to create a 
Common Economic Space” as a start 
towards a “new phase of economic in-
tegration.”4 The point is also made of a 
need to pursue an “agreed economic 
policy in several areas, harmonizing the 
relevant laws and establishing an inde-
pendent, regulatory intergovernmental 
Trade and Tariffs Commission.” This 
Commission would, it was initially as-
sumed, coordinate the CES member-
countries’ negotiations with the WTO 
and develop an agreed stance for sub-
sequent WTO entry as a common cus-
toms union. The Declaration reads that 
the “ultimate goal of the efforts is es-
tablishment of a Regional Integration 
Organization (RIO).” It also points to 
the beginning of intergovernmental ne-
gotiations on the measures required to 
develop the CES. The presidents set up 
as a standing executive body a joint 
High Level Group (HLG) of vice-
premiers from each country and ap-
proved a mandate for it. The HLG was 
assigned the priority task of drawing 
up by September 2003 the text of an 
intergovernmental agreement to serve as 
a legal framework for creating the CES. 
On September 19, 2003, heads of the 
four states signed at a Yalta (Ukraine) 
Summit a package of documents on 
building the CES, notably an Intergov-
ernmental Agreement and a Concept. 
On completion of intrastate procedures, 
these fundamental agreements were rati-
                                                   
4 Quoted from the Declaration of Presidents of 
the Russian Federation, Belarus Republic, Ka-
zakhstan Republic and Ukraine as a start to the 
formation of a Common Economic Space. Mos-
cow, Kremlin, February 23, 2003. 
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fied by the legislatures of Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Formation of a regional integration 
group of the four economically most 
developed post-Soviet states was initiated 
for a number of reasons. 
First and foremost there was dissatis-
faction with the current state of eco-
nomic cooperation among the CIS coun-
tries. This applies both to the entire CIS 
(CIS–12) and to the narrower regional 
associations such as EurAsEC and the 
United State of Russia and Belarus.5 
None of these associations with Russian 
participation could markedly boost in-
tra-CIS mutual trade or economic rela-
tions within the CIS. The Regional Inte-
gration Organization (RIO) mentioned in 
the Presidents’ Declaration is indicative 
of that, being conceived as a prototype 
for a new regional union. An economi-
cally powerful CES 4, pursuing agreed 
policy, could serve as a core and a 
motor for integration processes in the 
post-Soviet region.  
The CES 4 then accounted for 94 
per cent of CIS GDP, 89 per cent of 
goods turnover, and 80 per cent of 
population. This presaged the creation 
of quite a big internal consumer mar-
ket, close in population to the theoreti-
cally “optimal market size” for develop-
ing an up-to-date, diversified economy 
(250–300 million people). 
Russia’s CES partners are closely tied 
not only in energy supplies, as the ma-
jority of former Soviet republics are, 
but also in such areas as manufactur-
ing and basic and applied sciences. This 
is especially true of the relations be-
tween Russia and Ukraine, Russia and 
Belarus, and Ukraine and Belarus. As 
                                                   
5 See Table 1. 
potential integration partners the four 
states match to a greater extent than 
those that previously made up EurAsEC 
earlier (remarkably, Tajikistan and Kyr-
gyzstan are much less developed than 
Russia, Belarus or Kazakhstan). Of all 
post-Soviet states, Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus have the most diversified manu-
facturing, making them much better 
prepared for mutual cooperation in 
technologies and production than other 
CIS countries would be. Estimates by 
the CES Executive show the CES 4 to be 
in a position to offer the world market 
some 10–15 of the 50 or so macro-
technologies, provided they coordinate 
their activities and pool their efforts.6 
These include aviation, space and nu-
clear technologies, shipbuilding, trans-
port, chemical and power engineering, 
biotechnologies, etc. with an estimated 
aggregate market of almost USD 100 
billion by 2010. 
Yet another motive behind the CES 
project was the need for a “symmetri-
cal” response to pending EU expansion 
up to CIS borders in May 2004. The 
European Neighbourhood Policy pro-
claimed by Brussels in 2003, on the eve 
of its eastward expansion, extended also 
to East European countries (Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova) and Transcaucasia 
(Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan). The de-
clared EU policy goals within the “new-
six neighbours” zone were perceived 
with a certain anxiety in Russia.7 Au-
thoritative western political scientists also 
noted that an expanded Europe was 
likely henceforth to see these countries 
                                                   
6 Obshchestvo i Ekonomika, 2004:5. 
7 See Belov, E.: “European Union against Rus-
sia”. Rossiiskiye Vesti, December17–23, 2003; 
Kazin, F.: “What Big Europe Do We Need?” 
Russia’s perception of the EU new neighbour-
hood strategy. www.mpa.ru. 
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as a buffer zone between the EU and 
Russia.8 The integration initiative of the 
CES 4 was actually a response to a 
policy of ignoring the special rights of 
Russia as an heir to the Soviet Union 
within the Soviet sphere, and to a chal-
lenge to its national interests. The evolv-
ing union of the CES 4 included the 
major trade and economic partners of 
Russia immediately bordering on 
Ukraine and Belarus. Unfortunately, the 
CES project left out Moldova, also in 
Eastern Europe, and Armenia, which is 
united with Russia in a common secu-
rity system (the CIS Collective Security 
Treaty Organization). Apparently, ac-
count was taken of negative factors 
such as economic weakness in Moldova 
and Georgia and involvements in local 
territorial conflicts (Transdnistria, 
Abkhazia). 
There were economic reasons as well 
as geopolitical ones. All the early fore-
casts of the implications of EU eastward 
expansion pointed to increasing damage 
to the terms of trade between the CIS 
countries and their traditional partners 
in Central and Eastern Europe, while 
CIS competitiveness in the combined EU 
25 market would decline in several re-
spects.  
So the idea behind the customs union 
of the CES 4 was to compete jointly 
with the EU on the western borders of 
the CIS. The third important motive for 
the CES project design is apparently yet 
another Russia’s attempt to involve 
                                                   
8 Commenting on the neighbourhood policy, 
Alexandr Rahr, for example, of the Research 
Institute of the German Council on Foreign Re-
lations, told Washington Profile, “Vehement 
strife is pending in the next few years within 
Europe and set to turn Europe into ‘EU-Europe’ 
and Russia, dividing the continent between the 
CIS and EU.” 
Ukraine in the process of Eurasian inte-
gration, all previous such efforts having 
failed. Despite prospects of considerable 
preferences in the form of low energy 
prices and preferential transport tariffs, 
Ukraine did not sign the CIS Charter, 
preferring association with the EU 
(1993) and merely supporting the idea 
of a multilateral free-trade zone. The 
republic’s leadership ignored invitations 
to join the Union of Russia and Belarus 
(1999) and later EurAsEC (2000). 
Ukraine has always strongly objected to 
intergovernmental unions among CIS 
countries, if Russia is to be a member. 
It aspires to become an independent 
focus of integration for post-Soviet 
states that have chosen a Europe-
oriented vector for their foreign policies 
(the GUAM countries—Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova). So what had 
changed by the beginning of 2003? 
Trade between Russia and Ukraine in-
tensified in 2001–2. Russian capital be-
came involved in the privatization of 
Ukrainian businesses, while Ukraine’s 
image, in particular that of President 
Kuchma, steadily deteriorated, so that 
the prospects of European integration 
became more vague. So it was deemed 
wise under the circumstances to put yet 
another proposal to Ukraine and con-
vince it of the benefits of economic in-
tegration with the CIS countries. Fur-
thermore, there was specific pressure 
applied to President Kuchma personally 
to sign the Presidents’ Declaration, as 
his personal position against a growing 
opposition at home left him highly de-
pendent on Russian support. 
The new integration project caused 
something of a sensation in the CIS, 
giving rise to various contradictory 
comments. The Presidents’ Declaration 
11 
had not been expected by experts deal-
ing with cooperation among the newly 
independent states or by senior state 
officials.9 Indeed, there had been no 
mention of it made even on the eve of 
the summit, when the potential for 
EurAsEC was praised. This shows that it 
was drawn up by a small team of bu-
reaucrats close to Putin’s office, without 
wide public discussion or expert analy-
sis. 
Thereafter, the “opaque” manner of 
striking the agreements played a nega-
tive role: the CES concept was repeat-
edly criticized, especially in Ukraine, not 
always justifiably, and the very emer-
gence of the CES project was used by 
its opponents, in member-states and in 
the West, as a tool for political strug-
gle against the “imperial ambitions of 
the Kremlin”. Yet the project displays a 
novel integration concept, far from 
standard for the post-Soviet period. For 
the first time, CIS countries are trying 
to test a functional approach rather 
than an institutional one. All previous 
regional groups were created as inter-
national organizations. They started with 
the establishment of bureaucratic struc-
tures embodying a wide network of 
administrative bodies (intergovernmental 
councils, executive committees, etc.) The 
CES project, on the other hand, began 
as an economic venture that may turn 
into a regional integration organization 
only if a successful economic component 
emerges. 
                                                   
9 Boris Tarasyuk, Ukraine’s current foreign 
minister, was quoted as recalling “that when a 
decision of principle on creating the CES was 
made, Ukraine’s foreign minister and minister 
of economics and European integration learnt of 
it from the media.” Zerkalo Nedeli (Kiev), No. 
15, April 23–May 6, 2005. 
The fact that the CES agreement con-
tributed to raising mutual trade turn-
over in the member-states gave an im-
petus to new business contacts. CES 4 
trade volume in 2004 rose by 40.7 per 
cent, while that with the rest of the 
world grew by only 34.6 per cent. Rus-
sia’s goods turnover with other CES 
countries in 2004 exceeded the 2003 
volume of its trade with all other CIS 
countries (USD 40 billion as against 
USD 30 billion).10 Remarkably, Russia–
Belarus trade volume reached USD 15 
billion, that of Russia and Ukraine 
about USD 15 billion (goods only) plus 
some USD 20 billion of services; and 
that of Russia and Kazakhstan rose to 
USD 8 billion. The growth rate of trade 
between Ukraine and Belarus was also 
noticeable: figures for 2004 indicate 
that it exceeded USD 1 billion, with a 
mutual trade balance was about zero 
and the exchange balance improved.11 
Commodity turnover between Belarus 
and Kazakhstan increased to USD 67.7 
million in the first half of 2004, up 
88.6 per cent on the same period of 
2003.12 
The CES project has passed through 
three implementation phases so far:  
1) Preparing framework agreements 
(February 2003–May 2004). 
2) Developing a CES legal framework 
(June 2004–September 2005).  
                                                   
10 Quoted from a speech by V. Khristenko at 
the 16th HLG meeting on CES formation in Kiev, 
October 22, 2004. http://www.for-
ua.com/print.php?u=news/2004/10/22/161917.ht
ml.  
11 Quoted from a presentation by Andrei 
Kobyakov, vice-premier of the Republic of Bela-
rus, at the HLG meeting on October 22, 2004. 
12 Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta No. 1460, Sep-
tember 7, 2004. 
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3) Harmonizing the CES legal frame-
work at national and inter-
governmental levels, and preparing 
treaties for signing (autumn 2005–
autumn 2007). 
During the preparatory phase, the 
CES 4 progressed from the Presidents’ 
Declaration of intent to build a common 
economic space, to signing of multilat-
eral documents—the Concept of and 
Agreement on the CES (Yalta, September 
19, 2003). Later the framework docu-
ments were ratified by national legisla-
tures.13  
Development of the CES legal frame-
work took a further year. Ad hoc 
working groups of experts14 prepared a 
package of agreements incorporating 
about 90 international treaties (in the 
course of working-group activities, the 
number thereof varied between 93 and 
86). This package is a kind of CES 
code of practice or legal framework. 
The agreements embrace such key co-
operation areas as: 
∗ Tariff regulation, non-tariff regula-
tion, customs administration. 
∗ Competition policy, natural monopo-
lies, subsidies, privatization. 
∗ Technical regulations, intellectual 
property. 
                                                   
13 In spring 2004, the legislatures of the CES 4 
ratified the agreement on its creation in a 
package with CES concept: concurrently on 
April 20, 2004 in Russia and Ukraine, and on 
the 21st and 23rd in Kazakhstan and Belarus 
respectively. The ratification documents were 
signed by the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus on April 23, April 28 and May 14, 
respectively. The CES agreements and concept 
were deposited with Kazakhstan.  
14 Specialists from the CIS Executive, the Secre-
tariat of the EurAsEC Integration Committee, 
branch ministries, and scientific institutions. 
∗ Fiscal and monetary policy: currency 
regulation/control, macroeconomic in-
dicators. 
∗ Services. 
∗ Capital flows, investment. 
∗ Labour migration. 
This stage in the formation of the 
CES involved drafting treaties and har-
monizing the principles for concluding 
them, as a package or individually. In 
the latter case, there was the question 
of what order to sign them in. At a 
second summit of CES heads of states, 
held as part of a wider CIS summit at 
Astana, Kazakhstan, on September 15–
16, the CES 4 presidents appraised the 
legislative preparations and approved a 
list of 29 “first priority” treaties whose 
texts would be harmonized by Decem-
ber 14, 2004. The plan was then to 
start negotiations on these at interstate 
and inter-governmental levels, but the 
harmonization deadline was not met 
and it was apparent by mid-2007 that 
Ukraine would not sign the priority 
package, which was first scaled down 
(to 14–15) and then up (38) again.  
As work continued, the project con-
cept gradually became emasculated and 
confused, with conflict of interests ap-
pearing. When the CES concept and the 
quadripartite agreement were being 
prepared, there had been hardly any 
mention of ultimate goal of integration, 
a regional integration organization. Next 
the states abandoned the idea of joining 
the WTO as a foursome with a com-
mon customs union, preferring to con-
duct separate talks. One intractable 
problem was to establish a CES Regula-
tory Commission as a supranational 
body. Nor has there been any mention 
13 
for a long time of a potential common 
currency.  
Few of the earlier plans have been 
realized and they could hardly have 
been so with Ukraine acting from the 
outset of a “Trojan horse”. 
Back in August 2003, the Ukrainian 
delegation suggested applying the prin-
ciple of states being involved in project 
implementation at “different paces and 
different levels”.15 It was on these terms 
that Ukraine signed and later ratified 
the framework agreement. It also in-
cluded a reservation in the text: 
“Ukraine will take part in building and 
operating the Common Economic Space 
within limits consistent with Ukraine’s 
constitution.” The other states clearly 
had to agree to Ukraine’s preconditions 
if they wanted to preserve the project 
as such, for otherwise it would have 
broken down at the outset. 
The talks showed that the four coun-
tries each saw the future CES structure 
differently. They showed different levels 
of willingness to bring their economies 
closer together. Russia, Belarus and Ka-
zakhstan are agreed on deeper integra-
tion within the association. They are 
ready to establish a customs union and 
a common space that secures the “four 
freedoms of movement”—of goods, ser-
vices, capital and labour. Ukraine would 
prefer only to form a quadripartite free 
trade zone with all restrictions lifted. It 
is not yet ready to talk about deeper 
forms of multilateral cooperation and 
integration until it “sees how the free 
trade zone performs.” 
So the CES remains just an integra-
tion project rather than an international 
                                                   
15 Transactions of the 16th working meeting of 
the HLG in Kiev, August 20, 2003. 
organization or a real integrative asso-
ciation. None of the specific agreements 
within the CES framework has yet been 
signed. It became clear at a certain 
stage that unless Ukraine agreed to sign 
the entire first priority package (now 
made up of 38 documents laying the 
foundation for a customs union), the 
CES would be formed to three countries 
and develop thereafter as the fast-track 
core within EurAsEC established by a 
respective resolution of the EurAsEC 
summit of heads of state and govern-
ment in Autumn 2007. 
3) NEW APPROACHES TO 
RUSSIAN COOPERATION WITH 
CIS COUNTRIES 
Russia’s policy towards the CIS coun-
tries after the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion was ad hoc, with a policy emphasis 
on price preferences, above all in natu-
ral gas. The creation of alternative un-
ions, such as the Union State of Russia 
and Belarus or the EuroAsian Economic 
Community, was used as one means of 
applying pressure on CIS members per-
ceived as “disloyal”. In fact membership 
of all these unions was intended to of-
fer greater economic benefits than plain 
membership of the CIS, i.e. to stimulate 
the development of ties with Russia. But 
the expectations were not fulfilled, for 
one reason because of inconsistency in 
Russia’s policy towards “pro-Russian” 
and “pro-Western” states. So Belarus, 
Russia’s main military and strategic 
partner within the CIS and one of its 
main partners for cooperation in manu-
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facturing and IT, received USD 1.5-2 
billion dollars per year of direct or in-
direct subsidies from Russia in 1992–
2005. Meanwhile Ukraine, which did 
not even sign the CIS Charter, received 
subsidies whose size was no less and 
sometimes much greater than those to 
Belarus, in the shape of annual gas and 
other energy debt write-offs, preferential 
oil prices and special nuclear fuel 
prices for Ukrainian power stations. 
State debt restructuring reached an an-
nual level of USD 3–5 billion in 1999–
2003, according to estimates by S. Gla-
zieva and L. Kosikova. The financial 
help that Ukraine received in the presi-
dential election year (2004) cost Russian 
USD 1 billion through changes in the 
taxation of oil and gas exports. Yet the 
new Ukrainian government started by 
denationalizing premises owned by Rus-
sian investors in Ukraine, reconsidering 
the lease terms for the Russian naval 
base on the Black Sea, declaring its de-
sire to join NATO in the near future, 
etc. 
But there have been recent changes 
in Russian policy that weigh the foreign 
policies of CIS states. When the latter 
run counter to Russia’s interests, it 
withdraws financial help.16 Among the 
policy areas used are the passport and 
visa regime for crossing borders, the 
immigration regime (the number of 
days that can be spent in Russia with-
out registering), and tariff and non-
tariff restrictions on some “sensitive” 
export goods. In 2005–6, Russia put 
restrictions on products of the wine-
making industry and Borjomi mineral 
water from Georgia, on wines, fruit 
and vegetables from Moldova, and on 
                                                   
16 This trend was exemplified by the late 2006–
early 2007 oil conflict with Belarus. 
meat and milk products from Ukraine, 
saying they did not meet the medical 
inspection standards. Such measures 
were perceived by CIS and Western 
countries as economic sanctions on 
countries that sought to drop out of 
the CIS and join NATO. As a rule, they 
lacked any chance of exerting equiva-
lent pressure on Russia, though the 
problems with transit across Belarus 
and Ukraine showed that Russia had 
geographic weaknesses. 
Apart from such “compulsion to 
friendship”, Russia also applies a prin-
ciple of “pragmatism” in its relations 
with CIS countries. This is manifested 
most clearly in consecutive refusals to 
grant former preferences to CIS part-
ners. The Russian Foreign Ministry con-
siders a move to market principles in 
trade and economic relations as “evi-
dence of mature mutual relations”.17 
Meanwhile the remaining links between 
CIS members and Russia are justified 
by short-time profit but in strategic 
terms detrimental. Price preferences are 
no replaced by any other “new ties” or 
attractive project of modernization to 
strengthen the “Russian vector” and off-
set CIS external cooperation in other 
directions. 
Although pragmatism cannot replace 
strategy, there can be grounds for it. 
Russia has a high number of claims 
against its CIS neighbours. It has not 
profited from the great financial infu-
sions it has made in the region. Russian 
investors and other enterprises operating 
on CIS internal markets have not re-
ceived significant advantages from them 
either. Direct or indirect subsidies to 
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Life. 2007:1–2, 79. 
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the CIS countries have either been 
treated simply as state revenue trans-
ferred to private bank accounts through 
the widely used shadow schemes. At 
present, Russia’s partners are often be-
wildered by the figures indicating the 
scale of real aid because it has not al-
ways been mentioned in interstate 
agreements or reported in the media. 
Any references to financial aid are seen 
in the CIS countries today as unjustified 
reproaches made by a large, resource-
rich Russia against ostensibly small, 
poor states. All these factors hinder fur-
ther real cooperation based on mutual 
partnership. 
The low efficiency of Russia’s financ-
ing of the economies and public of the 
newly independent states is explainable 
because there have never been political 
inducements for it to be otherwise. This 
is a very serious flaw in its post-Soviet 
policy. Relations with the CIS countries 
were built up by the international fi-
nancial organizations and Western 
countries on a quite different basis. To 
obtain a credit tranche from the IMF, 
the recipient country had to sign a 
memorandum setting forth the IMF loan 
terms. This gave an inducement to 
carry out reforms and created favour-
able conditions for activity by foreign 
firms. For example, the IMF could dic-
tate to the government of Ukraine what 
level of duty on sunflower-seed imports 
to introduce to ensure high profitability 
for joint ventures being established with 
Western food-industry partners. Mean-
while the Russian government was fail-
ing to make Ukraine transfer its pipe-
line systems to the international gas 
transportation consortium. This went on 
for over ten years even though Ukraine 
was the main export direction for deliv-
ering Russian gas to Europe and the 
neighbouring country was making an 
annual USD 2–2.5 billion out of this. 
Russia, at a new stage of relations with 
the CIS countries, should consider its 
strategic goals (the growing importance 
of the CIS countries as a source of 
population increase and preservation of 
its role as a key actor on the interna-
tional energy market), and it should 
devise a more rational policy that con-
siders all the factors that have recently 
been shaping relations with the CIS. 
The Eastern enlargement of the EU 
produced a zone of geographical con-
tact with Russia and the CIS. The new 
EU members now have common borders 
with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the 
Russian Federation. So Russia’s “near 
abroad” has also become the “near 
abroad” of the EU 27. 
Since the ten new member-states ac-
ceded in May 2004, the EU has begun 
a transition to a new stage of interac-
tion with the CIS countries. These con-
cerns with the establishment of mutual 
cooperation in various fields of politics, 
the economy and the humanitarian 
sphere, with the format of “neighbour-
hood”. Since the preparation of the first 
joint projects “for Eastern neighbours” 
(in 2003–4), European Neighbourhood 
Policy has extended geographically to 
three countries of the Southern Cauca-
sus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
All members of the Neighbourhood Pol-
icy have adopted action plans and are 
working out new supplementary mecha-
nisms of cooperation—strategies and 
indicative programmes of cooperation 
for each country in the “neighbourhood 
belt”, memorandums on mutual under-
standing concerning cooperation in the 
energy sphere in Azerbaijan, and “en-
ergy dialogue” with Ukraine, and fi-
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nancing of EU activities in the CIS 
countries is increasing. 
The concept of an enlarged EU with 
“neighbouring countries” is being sub-
stantially amplified, so changing the 
model of EU–Russian relations estab-
lished in the 1990s and creating a tri-
angular Russia–EU–CIS situation. This is 
usually concealed in official inter-state 
relations and contacts on the highest 
level. But experts persist in drawing the 
attention of political leaders to the geo-
political triangle forged in Eastern 
Europe. 
Russia’s official attitude to European 
Neighbourhood Policy is somewhat am-
biguous. It is quite often interpreted as 
a serious challenge to Russia’s presence 
and influence in the whole post-Soviet 
region in the long term. Still more 
negative is Russia’s attitude to the pos-
sibility of EU intervention, as there is no 
concurrent creation of equal global 
partnership in the security sphere, 
whose necessity is not recognized by all 
EU countries. 
The EU aspiration to control its East-
ern neighbours is backed by the wel-
coming policy of certain CIS countries, 
for which accession to the EU and NATO 
(which may even lead to full integra-
tion) is the main external policy prior-
ity. Such is the case with Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia, and to some ex-
tent Azerbaijan. All these countries form 
part of the regional GUAM, which is 
considered an alternative to “pro-
Russian” alliances in the post-Soviet 
space and seeks to develop cooperation 
with NATO through various partnership 
programs. 
The new situation in the “near 
abroad” means that Russia should re-
consider urgently its approach to part-
nership with states in the post-Soviet 
space. 
4) RELATIONS IN A NEW 
SECTOR: “THE RF–EURO 
EAST” 
It is necessary to devise a model of co-
operation that takes into account the 
aspirations of some East European CIS 
countries to cooperate closely with the 
EU (even acceding to it, problematic 
though this may seem today) and their 
desire to cooperate with Russia in the 
spheres where they see this as benefi-
cial. 
As far as economic cooperation be-
tween Russia and its partners in the EU 
and CIS goes, it is important to find a 
way to “combine” the concepts of the 
two economic spaces—the common 
European economic space between the 
RF and the EU, and the Common Eco-
nomic Space/Common Market ( as a 
triple or quadruple union). None of the 
projects of integration have been 
shaped. There are political declarations 
of readiness to cooperate and some 
framework agreements, but no well-
devised, practical drafts confirmed by 
relevant international treaties. 
Unfortunately the model for Russia’s 
relations with its “common neighbours” 
in the CIS has not been devised yet 
even at concept level, let alone in terms 
of practical cooperation. However, some 
of the difficulties in Russia’s cooperation 
with Eastern European countries have 
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emerged. Russia has to establish bilat-
eral relations while bearing in mind 
that the EU and its collective external 
policy towards the CIS has the support 
of NATO and the United States. 
The widespread opinion in Russian 
political circles that European 
Neighbourhood Policy is incapable of 
preparing its partners for future EU 
membership (and that is not a goal as 
such) quite often misleads those who try 
to assess the integration prospects for 
Russia and the states of the 
“neighbourhood belt”. It somehow comes 
to be believed, for example, that if 
Ukraine does not join the EU, at least 
in 10–15 years, it will gain an incentive 
to join regional unions with Russia. 
Meanwhile the countries oriented to-
wards Europe have no dilemmas to 
solve. This, in our opinion, is how the 
split in the post-Soviet space comes to 
deepen into pro-Russian and pro-
European blocs.  
Clearly the strategy of regional 
(Euro-Asian) integration for the CIS 
countries has not been universally 
adopted. There are serious internal and 
external obstacles to such a model. 
There are grounds for believing that 
Russia will revise its policy towards the 
CIS countries in the near future: 
∗ It will establish “special” relations 
with its closest allies in the common 
security system, while pursuing a 
state policy of integration. 
∗ It will set up partnership and eco-
nomic cooperation at various interac-
tion levels with the rest of the coun-
tries, while pursuing Russian 
neighbourhood policy. 
∗ It will consolidate the post-Soviet re-
gion round Russia under conditions 
of growing competitiveness, on a ba-
sis of flexible combination of integra-
tion policy for the allies and of 
neighbourhood policy for other part-
ners. 
It is clear that Russia’s relations with 
the newly independent states have un-
dergone several transformations in line 
with the mentioned “consolidation–
alliance/integration–neighbourhood” ap-
proach. These steps were made to ren-
der the CIS and EurAsEC consistent 
with the new developments at the CIS 
and EurAsEC summit in Dushanbe in 
October 2007. There CIS heads of state 
signed a concept for further develop-
ment of the CIS and a plan for major 
developments in fulfilment of the con-
cept. These state the aim of completing 
the formation of a free trade zone and 
further advance in line with the rules 
and norms of WTO. 
At the EurAsEC summit, the heads of 
state of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia 
signed an agreement on forming a 
common customs zone, took decisions 
on establishing a Customs Union Com-
mission of Russia, Belarus and Kazakh-
stan and an action plan for implement-
ing one. 
 
* * * * * 
